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China’s political system has long been perceived as a controversial one 
and as somewhat perplexing to Westerners. In an attempt to understand 
the stability and success of the system, I evaluate the Chinese Commu-
nist Party’s (CCP) post-Mao society by comparing it to the “just society” 
described in Plato’s Republic. Plato’s philosophy is an appropriate stan-
dard against which the Chinese system can be assessed, because Plato 
does not believe in democracy and thus does not entertain its “advan-
tages.” What’s more, the Republic is classified as a utopia, meaning a 
place in which the state of things is perfect. As a result, Plato’s society is 
not affected by certain situational complications that would need to be 
considered, and would likely cloud the clarity of my argument, should 
I have chosen to use the political system of an existing country as my 
benchmark. In this paper, I will ultimately conclude that the Chinese 
political system satisfies enough of Plato’s criteria for a “just society” 
to be deemed an effective regime. In closing, I will offer my own opinion 
as to whether or not Plato’s model can truly offer a useful lens through 
which one may better understand the Chinese political system.
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Introduction
China’s political system has long been perceived as controversial and as 
particularly “puzzling to most Westerners.”1 In an attempt to understand 
the stability and success of the system, I will evaluate the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s (CCP) post-Mao society by assessing how it is similar to 
and how it differs from the “just society” described in Plato’s Republic. 
Plato’s philosophy is an appropriate standard against which the Chinese 
system can be assessed for a number of reasons. The political theory set 
forth in the Republic is widely respected and influential. Further, Plato 
does not believe in democracy and thus does not entertain its “advan-
tages.” As a Westerner who has been highly exposed to the democratic 
system, and educated in its “necessary” benefits, I feel that my own 
bias, and the importance I place on individual liberty, prevents me from 
adequately evaluating the Chinese system without Plato’s guiding rea-
soning. Additionally, the proposed institution in the Republic is classified 
as a utopia, meaning a place in which the state of things is perfect. Thus, 
Plato’s society is not affected by certain situational complications, such 
as the effect of globalization on the economy, global warming, or evolving 
societal norms. These elements would need to be considered, and would 
likely cloud the clarity of my argument, should I have chosen to use the 
political system of an existing country as my benchmark.
In this paper, I will ultimately conclude that the Chinese political system 
satisfies enough of Plato’s criteria for a “just society” to be deemed an 
effective regime. I will arrive at this deduction by presenting a number of 
parallels between the Chinese society and the utopian society, including 
censorship and rotational leadership. I will then highlight the differences 
between the two, such as the existence of corruption and the role of eco-
nomic growth. Following this, I will argue that these differences are the 
result of the limitations of a utopian society and will proceed to identify 
weaknesses that Plato’s blueprint neither foresees nor addresses. I will 
also acknowledge strengths of the Chinese political system that contra-
dict Plato’s theories. Finally, I will offer my own opinion as to whether 
or not Plato’s model can truly offer a useful lens through which one may 
better understand the Chinese political system.
1. Teresa Wright, Party and state in post-Mao China, (John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 3.
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Similarities between the CCP and the Republic
The most evident similarity between Plato’s Republic and the Chinese 
political system is the authoritarian leadership style upon which both 
societies are founded. Plato does not believe equality is desirable and 
views hierarchy as a tool to achieve efficiency and organization. Specif-
ically, his “Principle of Specialization” appears to be quite communistic: 
“more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each 
person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right 
time, and is released from having to do any of the others.”2 He further 
justifies his logic by explaining that justice, the core virtue of his ideal 
society, is not “a matter of fairness” but, rather, “the practice of minding 
one’s own business.”3 This definition of justice is defended by equating 
injustice with factions, leading Plato to equate justice with unity. 
This basic principle serves to promote many aspects of the Chinese polit-
ical system that one might otherwise view as weaknesses or criticize as 
being “unfair,” such as leadership politics being a “black box,”4 prohib-
ited opposition parties, a lack of meaningful elections at the national and 
most sub-national levels, repressed political dissent, constricted freedom 
of expression, and censored media.5 
In China, the CCP is responsible for upholding the authoritarian lead-
ership style that Plato endorses. Although the Party6 and the state are 
nominally separate, the political reality largely reflects Plato’s structure, 
as the Party controls the state. It is thus no wonder why “the regime is 
typically referred to as a party-state.”7 This is illustrated by the break-
down of the membership of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
highest state body. According to Wright, “roughly 70% of NPC delegates 
are CCP members,” demonstrating that the ruling regime “works from 
top to bottom.”8
2.  Plato, Republic, Ancient Philosophy, Ed. Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann 
(Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson, 2008), Vol. 1 of Philosophic Classics, 210-283, 
(Book II). 
3. Ibid.
4. Susan V. Lawrence and Michael F. Martin, “Understanding China’s political 
system,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, (2013).
5. Wright, Party and state, 4.
6. The capital-p “Party” here, and henceforth, refers to the Chinese Communist 
Party, or the CCP.
7. Wright, Party and state, 19.
8. Ibid, 20.
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Despite changing leadership, the authoritarian approach has remained 
consistent; political conservatism was emphasized even under former 
leader Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and stress on openness. Some 
are of the view that current president Xi Jinping is “reverting to a more 
centralized approach.”9 In the eyes of Plato, this only strengthens the 
system’s effectiveness. True to the philosopher’s beliefs, it is this author-
itarian nature of the post-Mao party-state that has enabled the positive 
impact of China’s leaders’ pragmatism, as it allows the top political 
leaders to take decisive action in “the areas where goods and services 
provisions [are] most lacking.”10 An example of this can be seen in the 
significant efforts made by the party-state leaders to address the severe 
degradation of China’s natural environment and its horrific consequences 
on the health of all Chinese residents. The 2017 Air Pollution Prevention 
and Control Action Plan, and existing goals to reduce coal and petroleum 
since 2006, have made noticeable progress and would not have been pos-
sible under a different regime. 
Other benefits of an authoritarian government to which China owes its 
success and stability are long-term policy focus (due to the absence of 
re-election worries), policy consistency (due to power remaining in the 
hands of a single political party with consistent ideology), and policy 
“purity” (due to diminished pressure to accommodate wealthy donors in 
exchange for funding.) Although Plato never entertains the prospect of 
wealthy donors, his disregard for the role of money in his “just society” 
and his emphasis on properly training the next philosopher-king succes-
sor demonstrate an intent to prevent such corruption and inconsistency.
This emphasis on training, as a requirement prior to holding a position 
of government leadership, is another commonality shared between both 
political structures. While Plato describes detailed and distinct education 
systems for guardians and philosopher-kings, the CCP equally develops 
the role of education, particularly in the post-Mao era when “people who 
occupy leadership positions in the party-state are much more pragmatic 
and educated.”11
An aspect of the arduous education proposed by Plato consists of ten years 
devoted to studying mathematics, five years devoted to studying 
9. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, ed. Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party, 
(Routledge, 2017).
10. Wright, Party and state, 188.
11. Ibid, 50.
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philosophy, and a final five years devoted to studying dialectic. The CCP’s 
post-Mao party school system is not quite as rigid but, likewise, serves 
to educate (or, “indoctrinate,” as Wright states) governing officials.12 
Since 2006, a minimum of three months of training every five years has 
been required by all Party officials. The CCP’s Organization Department 
determines where each cadre will be trained. Most notable is the Central 
Party School (CPS) in Beijing, commonly referred to as the Party’s main 
“think tank,” which “hosts debates…and oversees most Party schools at 
lower levels.”13 Additionally, there are two training academies located in 
China’s interior that specialize in Party history and one training academy 
located in Shanghai’s Pudong area, which specializes in China’s reform, 
innovation, HR management, and leadership methods.14
Unlike Plato’s pre-determined educational trajectory, the Chinese edu-
cation system can evolve according to the Party’s present needs. For 
example, in August 2013, after media outlets were informed that the 
“political reliability” of all journalists would be reviewed, 250,000 jour-
nalists were sent to a three-month training program that “educated” its 
attendees in the Party’s view of “socialist journalism.”15
Plato explains that the education of the guardians serves mainly to render 
them “noble puppies,” meaning they learn to blindly accept beliefs and 
behaviors and not to think critically or independently.16 Although there 
is no direct equivalent to the class segmentation system used by the CCP, 
I believe that the same goal of creating “noble puppies” applies to the 
education system of Party members. (In fact, it should be noted that Jiang 
Zemin’s “Three Represents,” which modernized the CCP to be inclusive 
of the entire population, ultimately served to strengthen Party power.)
The philosopher-kings, the most elite and powerful ruling class in Plato’s 
utopia, can be likened to the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Commit-
tee (PBSC), and the General Secretary. According to Plato, this class is 
required to “watch over and care for the other citizens” by nature of their 
intellectual and moral superiority.17 Although the moral purity of the top 
political leaders in China’s system is often questioned, the elite of both 





16. Plato, Republic, Book III.
17. Ibid, Book VII, 520b.
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power than the rest of the population, despite ambiguity in the methods 
used to arrive at their final conclusions. Perhaps in the case of the CCP, 
“moral superiority” can be more accurately described as the uniformity 
and strength in their “belief that in order to maintain CCP dominance of 
the political system, the system needs to deliver.”18 Of course, this por-
trayal of Chinese politics is largely oversimplified; discussion will later 
focus on the consequences of the role of corruption and the complex 
reality that leadership in the Chinese system is, in many ways, more like 
a matrix than a pyramid.
While Plato’s society is heavily segmented into three distinct classes (the 
workers, the guardians, and the philosopher-kings), which, for each 
person, is pre-determined at birth, membership to the CCP is open to all 
citizens. Originally, membership within the Party was open only to those 
with unquestionable class “credentials” and communist commitment, as 
Mao’s CCP prioritized being “representative of China’s working class.”19 
However, much has changed since then, and China’s governing institu-
tions have since become much more representative of the entire Chinese 
populace, including capitalists and intellectuals – groups that were once 
reprimanded and excluded from the Party.20
Deng’s emphasis on education is largely responsible for this change, as 
the Party shifted from seeking out communist ideological purity to exper-
tise in science, technology, and engineering. He has led efforts to bring in 
both new and younger leaders with more technical skill. As a result, “the 
percentage of college-educated members of the Central Committee (CC) 
has grown to nearly 100 percent.”21 For Plato, it is the class that possesses 
the knowledge and that has received the finest and most relevant educa-
tion that is deemed fit to rule and make decisions on behalf of the entire 
population. The CCP’s emphasis on education post-Mao shares this basic 
principle, despite differing on Plato’s membership qualifications in the 
sense that the CCP’s can be earned and learned.
Similarly, the Party’s transition from tolerating to embracing private 
businesses, which began in the late 1980s, reflects the same value 
placed on expertise. More specifically, as economic growth has played 
an important role in China’s increased presence and relevance in the 
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global economy, this inclusion further strengthens the CCP and creates 
a more united China. Notable events that established this change include 
Deng’s “Southern Tour” in 1992, which encouraged and supported the 
development of China’s private sector, and Jiang’s “Three Represents” 
in 2002, which announced the acceptance of China’s “advanced pro-
ductive forces,” which include private entrepreneurs.22 While the 
opportunity for socio-political upward mobility directly contradicts 
Plato’s definition of justice, it enables the CCP member-selection 
process to be increasingly more meritocratic and regularized, two char-
acteristics that are consistently present throughout Plato’s Republic.
The statecraft training techniques that both Plato and the CCP require are 
put in place so that competent leaders come to power rotationally, in order 
to best serve the interests of the people. In modern terms, “rotation” 
can be equated with “tenure,” which Deng worked to establish as part of 
his effort to regularize leadership succession at the top of the Party. In 
addition to establishing a retirement age of 68 years for PBSC members, 
Deng also created the Central Advisory Committee (CAC) for elderly 
leaders to transition out of formal positions of power and established a 
two-term limit (ten years total) for his successor.23 Additionally, much 
as how Plato’s philosopher-kings are expected to embody the virtues of 
society, Politburo members are expected to demonstrate integrity and 
self-restraint – requirements for Chinese leadership – by constructively 
criticizing both themselves and their colleagues in closed-door sessions.
Since Deng, leadership succession, though not fully institutionalized, 
has certainly come a long way – especially in comparison to the Mao-era 
practice of remaining in office until death. At the 16th Congress in 2002, 
the first “smooth” transition began when Hu Jintao, who joined the PBSC 
in 1992, replaced Jiang Zemin as Party General Secretary; he then gradu-
ally took over as President in 2003 and as CMC Chair in 2004.24 Xi Jinping’s 
2012 transition at the 18th National Congress was even cleaner, as he 
became both CMC Chair and Party General Secretary simultaneously.25 
While much of the selection process remains unclear to outsiders, “selec-
tion of the Politburo and PBSC members broadly follow long-standing 
22. David M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping 
to Xi Jinping, (Univ of California Press, 2014), Chapter 3.
23. Wright, Party and state, 53.
24. Yongnian Zheng, “The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party: Institutionalization of Succession Politics,” In Leadership in a Changing 
China, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005), 15.
25. Lampton, Following the Leader, 174.
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norms,” where members of the Party elite nominate the appointed mem-
bers.26 This marks another feature that the Chinese system shares with 
Plato’s model: rulers must bring up, assess, and select their successors, 
ideally on merit. In Chinese politics, “merit” refers to experience running 
one or more provinces, demonstrated pragmatic success in implementing 
policy, and Party loyalty. Much like Plato’s “final trial,” the two leading 
candidates serve five years in the Politburo as a form of “final assess-
ment,” before formally assuming the top positions of state president and 
premier.
Perhaps most surprisingly, censorship and propaganda are tactics used 
by Plato and Chinese political leaders alike. Despite consistently claim-
ing the moral high-ground, Plato endorses censorship as a necessary 
tool in the creation of his utopia. Specifically, one aspect of educating 
guardians involves recounting “hero poetry,” in order to immunize the 
guardians against death.27 In order for this to be effective, the storylines 
must portray the heroes as graceful and must avoid portraying death as 
something to be feared. Similarly, his proposed musical education begins 
with storytelling during the early years of childhood and enforces strict 
censorship, since young children are malleable and “can’t judge what is 
hidden sense and what is not; but what he takes into his opinions at that 
age has a tendency to become hard to eradicate and unchangeable.”28 
The Chinese political system similarly believes that ideology must be 
taught from a young age and must be consistently publicized via all 
outlets and institutions. In the same way that Plato’s philosopher-kings 
are the only citizens to possess true knowledge (while all other citizens 
of the state merely possess belief and habit), Chinese rulers have demon-
strated attempts to limit the critical thinking and mold the beliefs of the 
citizenry. Xi Jinping’s Document 9 is perhaps the best and most recent 
portrayal of this censorship, as it warned of the threat of “false ideologi-
cal trends, positions and activities” and placed new limits on the number 
of foreign shows allowed to be aired on television (the modified rule now 
allows one broadcast per year per station and one musical talent show per 
three months). On a similar note, Xi’s Ideological Purification Campaign, 
aimed at purifying public thoughts and expressions, called for greater 
“ideological guidance” at universities and ordered academics to censor 
26. Joseph Fewsmith, “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi Jinping’s New 
Age,” China Leadership Monitor 55, (2018), 17.
27. Plato, Republic, Book V.
28. Ibid, Book II, 378d.
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the following “seven sensitive issues”: “universal values, freedom of the 
press, civil society, civil rights, past Party mistakes, crony capitalism and 
judicial independence.”29
In addition to removing potentially consequential information, the CCP 
also publicizes biased information in order to promote their own power. 
Plato calls this a “noble lie,” and the CCP appears to agree. Despite the 
transition post-Mao from an emphasis on “redness” to an emphasis 
on “expert,” the stability and success of the CCP continues to depend 
on strong ideological belief. This is best illustrated by Xi Jinping’s China 
Dream, which paints a picture of China achieving national rejuvenation 
through Party-building and deepened reform. It is also exemplified by Xi’s 
response to the county’s “unruly Internet culture,” in which he ordered 
the “Communist Party’s propaganda machine to build a ‘strong army’ to 
‘seize the ground of new media.’”30 A more general illustration of the pro-
pagandizing tactics used is the requirement that stations broadcast “at 
least 30 percent of their air time to ‘public-interest’ programming, such 
as documentaries, educational and ‘morality-building’ shows.”31 Like-
wise, Plato breeds a sense of patriotism into his citizens by telling them 
that they are all born out of the ground and that their pre-determined 
class rank can be explained by the Myth of the Metals, which clarifies that 
each citizen is born with a bronze, silver, or gold soul correlating to their 
rank.32 (While a persuasive legend might settle class satisfaction in a 
utopia, it is unlikely to do so in reality; perhaps this explains the openness 
of the previously discussed CCP membership policy.)
Differences Between the CCP and the 
Republic
While there is a plethora of similarities between the Chinese political 
system and Plato’s Republic, the reality of the CCP does not quite live up to 
Plato’s standards in more ways than one. First and foremost, corruption, 
from which Plato protects his citizens by removing money from the state 
29. Wright, Party and state, 190.
30. Robert Gifford, “Xi Jinping’s vision: Chasing the Chinese dream,” The 
Economist 4, (2013).
31. Jayadeva Ranade, “China: Document No. 9 and the New Propaganda 
Regime,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies 4175, (2013).
32. Plato, Republic, Book II.
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and by depriving the powerful from owning private property and raising 
families, is endemic in the CCP.
This corruption can be traced back to the very beginning: the recruitment 
process of the CCP. Despite successful efforts for China’s post-Mao polit-
ical system to recruit and reward leaders based on merit, there continue 
to be many who are recruited and rewarded based on political connec-
tions or, as Wright suggests, outright bribery.33 Further, Party and state 
officials are cognizant of the fact that they are evaluated according to 
their success in promoting economic growth and ensuring political sta-
bility in their locality. As a result of this awareness, these considerations 
“pre-dominate their formulation of preferences and their perception of 
their most important tasks,” and oftentimes even lead them to engage in 
corrupt practices at the cost of the local populace’s needs, in the inter-
est of economic growth.34 Generally speaking, the corruption occurs out 
of an official’s need to maintain their position and rise through political 
ranks. For this reason, Plato does not allow mobility. Though this cor-
ruption begins with CCP recruitment, it certainly does not end there. In 
fact, according to David Lampton, it has trickled down to the point where 
“empowered corrupt local officials, crime syndicates, some military 
leaders, and rogue entrepreneurs engage in behavior that is [not] in the 
interests of its local citizens.”35
Despite the CCP’s sharp deviation from Plato’s anti-corruption approach, 
it still recognizes the issue as a pressing one and has actively tried to 
diminish it in more recent years.  Xi Jinping’s first major campaign focused 
on eradicating corruption and explicitly banned lavish expenditures by 
political cadres, the construction of new government buildings for the 
next five years, and any “competing for ostentation.”36 Xi announced the 
Anti-Graft campaign as a “year-long effort to rid the Party of ‘formalism, 
bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance,’” and even went so far as to 
investigate and punish corrupt officials, most notably targeting the enor-
mous state-owned enterprise PetroChina.37
In addition to corruption, China’s political system also largely revolves 
around money – yet another drastic difference from Plato’s money-less 
society. Deng’s reform era marked a shift in focus, with his priority being 
33. Wright, Party and state, 64.
34. Ibid, 72.
35. Lampton, Following the Leader, 74.
36. Wright, Party and state, 189.
37. Ibid.
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economic growth and putting an end to class struggle.38 He adapted China’s 
pride in “self-reliance” to that of “absorbing from other countries,” 
and pursued initiatives such as attracting foreign capital, developing 
the export industries, and establishing Special Economic Zones.39 As a 
result, China’s GDP growth rates have “rocketed” and created a “hybrid 
economic system that features both free-market capitalism and state 
direction.”40 Specifically, GDP grew 630% from 1980-2005, and the last 
Five Year Plan objectives announced a desired GDP growth rate of 6.5% 
and doubled per-capita income from 2010-2020.41 While this emphasis on 
economic development also enables corruption (by emphasizing material 
incentives) and has led to the emergence of significant “domestic eco-
nomic inequalities,” it has also resulted in “virtually all Chinese citizens 
[experiencing] a dramatic rise in incomes and living standards.”42 Thus, 
although Plato saw money as an unnecessary evil, I believe that China’s 
decision to embrace the opportunity for economic growth and become 
recognized by the global economy was an intelligent political decision and 
one that has ultimately become one of its greatest strengths. 
On another note, the CCP arguably does not live up to Plato’s extreme 
totalitarian leadership ideal. While the Chinese political system can cer-
tainly be classified as authoritarian in many regards, it has also evolved to 
become increasingly more responsive to the public. Wen Jiabao supports 
this perspective, claiming China’s present policymaking “emphasizes 
solutions to major problems…relevant to…the mass public.”43 
Specifically, key demographic groups have been satisfied, like private 
entrepreneurs who feel supported by policy as partners of the state and 
university students who have been provided job opportunities by the 
CCP.44 Other examples of efforts made by the central government to satisfy 
the public’s need to voice their grievances include the Xinfang “letters 
and visits” system, Urban Residents’ Committees, local elections for rural 
village councils, and more informal mechanisms such as Internet posts 
and street protests. The CCP has also incorporated some democratic fea-
38. Lampton, Following the Leader, Ch. 1.
39. Ibid.
40. Wright, Party and State, 185.
41. Michel Aglietta and Guo Bai, China’s 13th five-year plan. In pursuit of a 
“moderately prosperous society,” No. 2016-12, CEPII research center, 2016.
42. Wright, Party and state, 185.
43. Shaoguang Wang, “Changing models of China’s policy agenda 
setting,” Modern China 34, no. 1 (2008), 56-87.
44. Wright, Party and state, 88-95.
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tures at lower levels, such as allowing more candidates than seats in order 
to enable the CCP to weed out unpopular candidates. Further, livelihood 
issues now play an important role in dictating policy in modern China, 
which was reflected in Xi’s 2018 New Year Address.45 
Of course, it should be noted that, as with most things CCP-related, 
responding to the needs of the public became a priority only when Deng 
feared the CCP would lose legitimacy and the “sea would capsize the 
boat.”46 This was again evident under Hu’s leadership when China began 
to be perceived as a global threat, and the CCP realized that satisfying 
the needs of its people would ensure the domestic legitimacy that was 
necessary to secure international legitimacy. The policy changes and 
available outlets for voicing grievances also work to the Party’s benefit. 
For example, the increase in environmental protests in recent years, 
including the PX chemical protest in Xiamen in 2007, the Phoenix trees 
protest in Nanjing in 2011, and the migrant worker protest in Beijing in 
2017, has sparked awareness among CCP members to emphasize envi-
ronmental initiatives.47 In return for addressing major public grievances, 
the Chinese public has “exhibited little desire to upset the political status 
quo.”48 A similar line of reasoning led to the much earlier creation of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, which was “designed 
to bring together the various political parties and groups…to allow them 
some input…in the new regime” and to ensure that the “leadership of the 
CCP is upheld.”49 Interestingly (and quite contrary to Plato’s predictions), 
the Xi administration’s repressive measures, in some ways, may threaten 
the regime’s stability by hindering their ability to respond to the public’s 
needs.50
In addition to responding to its populace, the CCP also represents “frag-
mented authoritarianism” more so than being a true embodiment of 
45. Xi Jinping, “2018 New Year Address” (speech, Beijing, China, December 31, 
2017), CGTN, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3063444d35637a6333566d54/share_p.
html.
46. Lampton, Following the Leader, Ch. 2.
47.  Christoph H. Steinhardt and Fengshi Wu, “In the name of the public: 
environmental protest and the changing landscape of popular contention in 
China,” The China Journal 75, no. 1, (2016), 61-82.
48. Wright, Party and state, 184.
49. Ibid, 32.
50. Ibid, 195.
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an authoritarian regime.51 Its system is a vertical (tiao) and horizontal 
(kuai) grid, which creates implementation and governing problems that 
Plato’s ideal society did not face. For example, cadres can only coordi-
nate through hierarchy or preference-counting, resulting in a need for 
cross-system integrators. Much like the decision to respond to the public, 
the pluralization of leadership and society was largely developed out of a 
need for reform and the rebalancing of powers among central and local 
levels of government. A major advantage to this system, however, is that 
it allows for policy-testing through decentralized and local experiments, 
which is useful in a bureaucratic system as it allows for gradual policy 
change and flexibility.
Weaknesses of Plato’s Republic
While not all of the differences between Plato’s Republic and the Chinese 
political system have served as positive modifications (e.g., the corruption 
issue), it is extremely important to recognize that there are shortcomings 
to using Plato’s work as a lens through which one evaluates the CCP. The 
most obvious issue is that Plato is describing a utopia. Thus, while Plato’s 
model of removing money from society and prohibiting guardians and 
philosopher-kings from owning private property and having families 
may solve the issue of corruption, it is also blatantly unrealistic. Frankly, 
it does not account for the natural human disposition towards possession 
or the human craving for affection and is thus not a practical solution for 
China (or any real society) to implement. Similarly, while Plato describes 
rigid authoritarian rule, Wright points out that all “real-world regimes 
lie somewhere in between [democracy and authoritarianism]…they are 
dynamic.”52 Indeed, I believe China’s political system has demonstrated 
this ability to be dynamic and to adjust its leadership style when neces-
sary.
Further, while Plato does provide strong logical arguments for almost all 
aspects of his utopia, his theories are not tried and tested – he can only 
account for and respond to the counters that he thinks to consider. To 
some degree, the Chinese political system disproves a number of Plato’s 
deductions. For example, Plato is so rigid in his belief that justice depends 
on each class performing its proper function that he claims that “any 
51. Andrew Mertha, “‘Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0’”: Political pluralization in 
the Chinese policy process,” The China Quarterly 200, (2009), 995-1012.
52.  Wright, Party and state, 7.
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plurality of functions or shifting from one order to another is…utterly 
harmful” and “the extreme of wrongdoing.”53 However, the CCP’s 
ability to adapt by making leadership more pluralistic, responding to 
the needs of its populace, and being more inclusive of demographics has 
only strengthened its stability – quite to the contrary of Plato’s fears. Xi 
Jinping’s recent amendment to the constitution to extend his term will 
serve as another test of Plato’s prediction, but I personally do not foresee 
it being as “utterly harmful” as Plato warns.
There are also a number of weaknesses of the Chinese political system 
that Plato’s philosophy does not foresee. In some cases, it is not necessary 
for him to contemplate these situations as they are byproducts of things 
like questioning ideology or class, which he disregards from the begin-
ning. Nonetheless, they remain important aspects to consider.
First, a good successor cannot be guaranteed, as they are scouted so far 
in advance that the decision surely cannot consider whether they are best 
suited for the era in which they will be called to rule – or even whether the 
foresight to select them was correct. Second, should an incompetent or 
corrupt leader come to power, there does not seem to be a way to restrain 
them or, more generally, to check and balance any leader once they have 
gained authority. This weakness is perhaps the main shortcoming of 
authoritarianism and the main selling point of liberal democratic systems, 
as they are much more effective at banning destructive leaders.54
Additionally, Plato does not consider the potential harm in not listen-
ing to or keeping up with a nation’s people’s needs. He assumes that the 
indoctrinated populace will not question their government and that the 
government will dictate and meet the needs of the people rather than 
vice versa. (In fact, he does not even explore what motivates the working 
class to do their job and act as a cog in the machine for the “good of the 
whole.”) However, the reality of the Chinese government does not reflect 
this. The landscape is changing in a number of ways and “expectations of 
the Chinese people are rising faster than the capabilities of the nation.”55 
Specifically, the GDP, once a metric of success of the economy’s growth, is 
slowing, and the population, once crucial to the cheap labor that enabled 
export-based growth, is aging. These changes are largely the result of 
China’s younger generation becoming more educated and concerned with 
53. Plato, Republic, Book IV, 434c.
54. Wright, Party and state, 195.
55.  Lampton, Following the Leader, 139.
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interests other than just money. Overall, China is struggling to maintain 
the performance that once served as validation for its legitimacy.
Plato also does not consider that there can be other politi-
cal powers that exist. However, this is a reality of the 21st century 
and has contributed to the changing landscape. The Chinese gov-
ernment has thus had to recognize and consider the influence of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), traditional media, large cor-
porations, and universities and research institutions to name but a few.
Closing Remarks
While Plato’s ideal is a thought-provoking and persuasive line of rea-
soning, there remain a number of issues with the basic principles that 
constitute the definition of justice that he sets forth. Albeit oversimplified, 
Plato’s explanation of “just” is basically synonymous with “class privi-
lege.” Further, since his entire concept of justice is built into the state, the 
theory of morality that he builds his entire philosophy upon is collectivist. 
As a result, what is good for the state is morally good, and what is bad for 
the state is morally bad. This rationale accounts for the justification of 
the aforementioned “noble lie,” as it reinforces state unity. Ultimately, 
Plato is implying that it is the job of the citizen to strengthen and stabilize 
the state, rather than framing stable governance as the job of the state, 
as Wright’s more popular perspective suggests.56 While comparing the 
two political regimes has certainly shined a light on the plausible benefits 
of authoritarianism, it has also reinforced my opinion that government 
ought to bridge the gap between leaders and the populace as opposed to 
creating a barrier, which I feel both the CCP and Plato’s philosopher-kings 
do more often than not. The CCP has, however, demonstrated a better 
understanding of the importance of connecting to the populace, as exhib-
ited by Xi’s explanation for launching his anti-corruption campaign: “if 
we don’t redress unhealthy tendencies and allow them to develop, it will 
be like putting up a wall between our Party and the people, and we will lose 
our roots, our lifeblood, and our strength.”57
Nonetheless, I do believe that the CCP can be deemed an effective political 
system based on my comparison to Plato’s Republic. I believe the strong 
similarities that both systems share, as well as careful consideration 
56. Wright, Party and state, Ch. 1.
57.  Ibid, 189.
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of the shortcomings of a utopia as an explanation for the differences, 
support my judgment. 
I also believe my evaluation of the Chinese political system highlights that, 
perhaps, with more transparency, freedom, and genuine local democracy, 
a realistic and stable version of Plato’s model could theoretically exist. 
Ultimately, however, Plato might still be correct in that “there will be 
no end to the troubles of states, or…of humanity itself, till philosophers 
become rulers in this world, or till those we now call kings and rulers 
really and truly become philosophers, and political power and philosophy 
thus come into the same hands.”58 
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